political or social harmonization, 4 identifying best practices 5 and transporting them elsewhere has become common-fare. Scholars who focus on "legal transplants" 6 tend to address two main sets of questions: first, how 3 See, e.g., Kim Seong-Hyun, The Democratization 77-78 (1994) (discussing the implementation of directives-which allow national governments to choose the form and method of compliance-as a mechanism for harmonization and detailing the negative consequences of using directives, such as increased fragmentation as a result of having two sets of rules, or legal ossification as a result of the difficult process in generating initial agreement on the directive). 
discussing the expectation that adopting "best practices" and incorporating legal standards into conventions and treaties will have the "double benefit of reducing transaction costs for transnational investors and increasing the quality of legal institutions" in developing countries); see also Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989) (discussing the approach of "better solution" comparative law scholars, who advocate for objective evaluation of the various solutions provided by the world's legal systems, and challenging the premise that there can be objectivity in identifying best practices). 6 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 7, 19 (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that comparative law is predominantly the study of a history of legal exchanges between legal systems, which consists of borrowing and modifying legal rules, and thus comparative law methodology should focus on legal transplants-the "borrowing and transmissibility of rules from one society or system to another" for the purpose of legal development); Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 174 (2003) (explaining the meaning of a legal transplant could be understood as follows: "[w]hen a transplant country applies a rule that it has transplanted from an origin, it is effectively applying a rule to its own local circumstances that was developed in a foreign socioeconomic order"); THE COMMON CORE OF 7 and second, how foreign laws interact with domestic legal systems. 8 Scholars generally do not contest that transplanted legal institutions have the potential to solve socio-legal problems. Transplanting legal institutions is a matter "of usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home . . . ." 9 Unfortunately, scholars have not examined institutions that are transplanted, not as a result of their usefulness, but rather because of their cultural and symbolic import. 10 Are the problems raised by using legal transplants to represent cultural and humanistic goals different from other cases where there is a transplant effect?
This Article discusses reforms to Canadian criminal sentencing procedures and the incorporation of Aboriginal methods into the criminal trial. In particular, this Article presents the transplanted "sentencing circle" 11 as an example of how legal scholars' and practitioners' views regarding legal instrumentalism 12 might be changing. This Article claims Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (citing three causes for the movement of law: power, prestige, and institutional change aimed at improving economic performance). 7 
See, e.g., Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the Transplantation of British
Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 561 (2009) (examining company law transplants in Palestine in the early 20th Century and arguing that lawyers, legal academics, and colonial legislators influenced the exportation of English company law to countries in the British Empire); see also WATSON, supra note 6. 8 See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 174 (arguing that a legal transplant "increases its own receptivity [in the import country] by making a significant adaptation of the foreign formal legal order to initial conditions, in particular to the preexisting formal and informal legal order. Changes in the transplanted rules or legal institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these rules has been considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic legal practice or other initial conditions.") ( 10 See discussion infra Part IV. A.
11 I refer to the traditional Aboriginal process and the process incorporated into the criminal trial by the following terms: "healing circle" and "sentencing circle" respectively. Some texts, government documents, and cases use these terms interchangeably. While there is no one form of healing circle that covers all traditional processes, I try to keep the terms separate, in the very least to place an emphasis on the process of transplantation.
that law reform goals have become more "expressive," 13 in that they include cultural and normative goals in addition to, or instead of, sociological goals. The effect is to "instrumentalize" 14 culture and normativity. 15 In gain in realism and effectiveness of thinking can come from consistently (not occasionally) regarding the official [legal] formulation as a tool, not as a thing of value in itself; as a means without meaning save in terms of its workings, and of meaning in its workings only when these last are compared with the results desired."); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 23, 26 (1924) ("As matter of actual fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation of a conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and then we look around for principles and data which will substantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently between rival conclusions. No lawyer ever thought out the case of a client in terms of the syllogism. He begins with a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable to his client of course, and then analyzes the facts of the situation to find material out of which to construct a favorable statement of facts, to form a minor premise. 125, 125 (1996) ; see R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask. R. 120, para. 27 (Can. Sask. C.A.) ("The very purpose of sentencing circles seems to be to fashion sentences that will differ in some mix or measure from those which the courts have up to now imposed in order to take into account aboriginal culture and traditions, and in order to permit and to take into account direct community participation in both imposition and administration of we measure the impact, effects, or the extent of "translation" 17 in such cases? What is the effect of transplanting legal institutions that are intended to fulfill both sociological and corrective justice goals? What if, in addition to being an example of best practices, the legal transplant is also meant to signify a move toward repairing historical injustices?
In 1992, Justice Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territorial Court used an approach based on local First Nations' methods of dealing with crime. 18 This was the first instance of adapting an Aboriginal healing circle for use in a Canadian criminal trial. 19 Following Justice Stuart's example, other trial judges began to conduct sentencing circles on an ad hoc basis as part of the discretion they had in sentencing decisions. 20 By the mid-1990s, judicial innovation, legislative reform, and bureaucratic efforts effectively "transplanted" Aboriginal healing circles into the criminal trial. Presently, sentencing circles contribute to the institutionalized landscape to such an extent that in April 2014 the Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario) unveiled a new courthouse with rooms specifically designed for Aboriginal conferencing and ceremonies. 21 Sentencing circles are a legal procedure in which "the community offers its input to the sentencing court." 22 During a sentencing circle, criminal justice participants and members of the community have an opportunity to speak about the crime in question and its impact on the community. 23 The [Vol. 25:61 number of participants can vary from ten to fifty individuals. 24 In sentencing circles, which may last several hours, participants often make sentencing recommendations. At the conclusion of a sentencing circle that the court holds as part of an adult criminal trial, the participants return the matter to the court for final submissions and judicial decision. The law does not require the judge to follow the sentencing circle's reccommendations. 25 In many ways, though, sentencing circles represent an exception to the trend currently underway in common law countries to curtail lay participation in sentencing. 26 Therefore, because sentencing circles involve significant community participation, it is important to analyze whether, and how, judges respond to sentencing circle recommendations in the final sentencing stage.
An additional goal of this Article is to identify and present a cultural turn in legal thinking, one in which the expressive genre of law (which generates and produces meaning) 27 serves to mark and achieve other goals. This Article presents a story of legal pluralism, attempts at multiculturalism, Aboriginal law, and alternatives to criminal sentencing procedures. On a deeper level, however, it provides an account of legal instrumentalism and what it currently means to use law as a tool for social change.
In Canadian sentencing reform, through an exercise in comparative criminal law, 28 scholars, practitioners, and activists made Aboriginal culture into an object of knowledge 29 165 (1996) (describing a sentencing circle that took place in the Nanuvik region of Quebec where the community's role was unclear). 24 Though often thought of as progressive in its pragmatic approach to law, there is a sense that legal instrumentalism, "the hegemonic logic of means and ends," 30 risks destabilizing developments in its effort to deem everything up for instrumental grabs. Therefore, instrumentalizing the expressivefashioning constructed expressions of culture into an instrument for usemay present new and troubling implications for what it means to employ the law as a tool metaphor. Scholars, practitioners, and reformers should become more familiar with the ways that back and forth movement between the instrumental and the expressive present a moment of jeopardy for unmet expectations. In the very least, they should make use of the technical legal devices and knowledge practices to which legal intermediaries regularly appeal. 31 This Article employs a mixed methodology; it looks at government, task force, and law reform commission reports, as well as all published decisions where sentencing circles were requested and/or used. Part II reviews more thoroughly the background and situates the reforms in comparative law literature in order to give context to the kinds of conversations that were going on about how to change criminal sentencing in Canada. Readers might react negatively towards Aboriginal law analyzed within the framework of comparative law and legal transplants. Clearly, the histories of colonial relations and confrontations with indigenous communities, marked by paternalism and overt efforts to suppress culture, preclude adopting the "apolitical" comparative law analysis. 32 35 and law and development literature. 36 Sitting at the intersection of those three disciplines, sentencing circles are uniquely positioned to prompt readers to consider assumptions about whose law is fit for transplanting and the kinds of questions that are asked in certain areas of law.
Part II chronicles a period of intense government scrutiny into Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system, the initial legislative and judicial reforms, the subsequent transplantation, and the institutionalization of sentencing circles into the criminal trial.
Part III adopts the typical comparative law and legal transplant approach, examining the process of transplantation and how sentencing circles fared once transplanted into the Euro-Canadian legal system. This Part presents a brief qualitative report of findings from all published Canadian decisions that dealt with sentencing circles, ranging from the first time a sentencing circle was held during a criminal trial in 1992 to decisions as recent as 2010. 37 This Article analyzes the outcomes of requests to hold a supra note 13, at 190. Put most simply, sentencing circles have been incorporated, transplanted, and used in the criminal trial. So, it still bears worth to investigate how this played out. 33 37 I chose December 2010 as the date to end data collection to provide a clean cut off point. I was also able to ensure I could access all the reported cases for that period, in case there was any sentencing circle at the sentencing phase, as well as outcomes on sentencing after a sentencing circle was conducted. Part III proceeds within a framework of lay participation in law, 38 arguing that the outcomes of incorporating these procedures should be judged against the kinds of goals that normally underlie lay and community participation in shaping sentences for convicted offenders. In this view, the ambiguous results become less important than the way those results were achieved.
The discussion in Part IV challenges legal intermediaries to address the "transplant effect." 39 It suggests that judges have tools that can be employed to assess and process sentencing circle recommendations. 40 Lay participation in sentencing has been all but eliminated in many jurisdictions-including Canada-so the ultimate authority for sentencing defendants resides with the judge. 41 Nevertheless, this Article suggests that where lay participation and culture is instrumentalized, judges may need to employ the law's technical contributions. 42 The suggestion to use formalities or technical legal approaches to distill Aboriginal procedures may seem odd. However, part of this Articles's is to query whether decoupling legal formalism from legal techniques 43 might mediate the risks associated with instrumentalizing normative and expressive goals.
delay between the decision and the reporting of the case. Admittedly, 2010 is an arbitrary cut off point, but, as there have not been any significant changes to the Criminal Code or to the way sentencing circles are being conducted, I have no reason to believe that the conclusions that I will draw are in any way affected by this cut off point. 38 See Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26. 39 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 167. 40 See infra Part IV. 41 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 720, s. 745, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995 c. 22, s. 6; 2015, c. 13, s. 23. Sentencing proceedings are carried out by the court, except where a jury finds an accused guilty of second degree murder, guilty of murder where the accused has a prior conviction for murder, or where the accused was under the age of sixteen; in these cases, the judge must give the jury the option to make a non-binding recommendation on the period the accused is required to serve before being eligible for release on parole. 43 See ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 70-71 (2011) [hereinafter COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE] (arguing that an ethnography of legal expertise must include a close examination "of the skill and the art, the aesthetics and the bricolage, the satisfaction of rehearsing and perhaps innovating upon or adding to a set of moves and postures one has observed, apprenticed, debated with other initiates," which is distinguishable from legal formalism, "the view that legal form constrains politics"); see also VALVERDE, supra note 29, at 28 (distinguishing between socio-legal scholarship, which examines the ways that law, formally applied, reproduces forms of power relations, and the study of the "mechanisms" by which law produces or "constitutes" knowledge).
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II. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW

A. Justice Studies 1967-1995
The Canadian government transplanted Aboriginal healing circles into the Canadian criminal trial following a cross-national exercise that analyzed Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system using a comparative law methodology. Starting from the position that the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the criminal justice system needed to change, government sponsored inquires focused on the conflict between justice values and principles by comparing Aboriginal and EuroCanadian approaches to crime. 44 Between 1967 and 1995, provincial and federal levels of government sponsored more than thirty justice studies 45 regarding the causes and effects of systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people. 46 For example, the Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta assigned former Chief Judge of the Provincial Court, Justice Allan Cawsey, a mandate "to complete a review of the criminal justice system in Alberta as it relates to Indian and Metis people." 47 The Alberta Task Force combined submissions from law organizations, researchers, and native groups with statistical data. Similarly, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples ("RCAP") heard testimony at public hearings, accepted submissions from organizations funded through an intervener participation program, sponsored research studies, and organized national "round tables" on Aboriginal issues, which brought together academics, practitioners, politicians, and community leaders. 48 First, task forces, inquiries, and royal commissions sought to understand why and how the criminal justice system negatively affected Aboriginal offenders. 49 They examined feelings of alienation, as well as the disproportionate representation of Aboriginal offenders in provincial and federal prisons. 50 For example, RCAP's comprehensive report found that, in Saskatchewan, a treaty Indian boy of sixteen had a 70 percent chance of serving a prison term by the age of twenty-five, while a non-Native Saskatchewan boy only had an 8 percent chance. 51 Comparing populations with penal statistics also illustrated the extent of over-incarceration. 52 In the 49 incarceration is a problem with the general population, it is of much greater concern in the sentencing of aboriginal Canadians. In the mid-1980s, aboriginal people represented about 2 percent of the population of Canada, yet they made up 10 percent of the penitentiary population. In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, aboriginal people constituted something between 6 and 7 percent of the population, yet in Manitoba they represented 46 percent of the provincial admissions and in Saskatchewan 60 percent. The situation has not improved in recent years. By 1997, aboriginal peoples constituted closer to 3 percent of the population of Canada and amounted to 12 percent of all federal inmates."). 54 ROYAL COMM'N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 53. 55 See, e.g., BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 41 (citing reports that found Aboriginal offenders more likely than non-Aboriginals to plead guilty even when they do not believe themselves to be guilty, and they were also less likely to benefit from plea bargains). 56 Nowhere else is the use of the criminal justice system to address a major social and economic problem so potentially problematic as it is in relation to [A]boriginal people. It is this group which appears to be incarcerated for less serious offences because its members do not qualify for probation, and few options but incarceration are available to judges. 57 Ultimately, reports explained Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system as a conflict between two sets of justice values. 58 By comparing Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal justice principles and approaches to crime, inquiries revealed the extent to which the criminal justice system was alien and oppressive to Aboriginal people. 59 For example, Judge Murray Sinclair, Co-Commissioner of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, compared Euro-Canadian punishment and deterrence approaches to Aboriginal justice principles. While acknowledging that there was no universal Aboriginal conception of justice, he explained an Aboriginal conception of justice "would be that of restoring peace and equilibrium to the community through reconciling the accused with his or her own conscience and with the individual or family that [was] wronged." 60 By comparison, Euro-Canadian justice considers offenders to be harmful to society and punishes them in order to deter harmful, deviant behavior by that offender and others in the future. 61 governmental jurisdictions. The principal reason for this crushing failure is the fundamentally different world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people with respect to such elemental issues as the substantive content of Justice and the process of achieving Justice.") 57 LaPrairie, supra note 50, at 437. 58 See, e.g., DUMONT, supra note 50, at 28; Leonard Mandamin, Aboriginal Justice Systems, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 275, 281 (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples eds., 1993) ("For Aboriginal people the emphasis is on restoration and healing rather than punishment"); BRIDGING THE 59 See, e.g., DUMONT, supra note 50, at 32; MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 28-31; BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 58 ("It is difficult and disturbing to realize that Aboriginal people see the non-Aboriginal justice system as alien and repressive, but the evidence permits no other conclusion."). 60 Sinclair, supra note 58. 61 Id.
In its position paper on incarceration, the Community Holistic Circle Healing Program: Hollow Water First Nation, 62 also compared the two approaches to justice as follows:
Our tradition, our culture, speaks clearly about the concepts of judgement and punishment. They belong to the Creator. They are not ours . . . . People who offend against another (victimizers) are to be viewed and related to as people who are out of balance-with themselves, their family, their community, and their Creator. A return to balance can best be accomplished through a process of accountability that includes support from the community through teaching and healing. The use of judgement and punishment actually works against the healing process. An already unbalanced person is moved further out of balance . . . .
The adversarial approach also places the victimizer against his or her community. As we see it, this goes against the very essence of the healing process. For us, healing (breaking the cycle) is based on (1) the victimizer taking full responsibility for his/her actions, (2) the victim understanding and integrating this into day-to-day living, and (3) the COMMUNITY being able to support, assist, and/or hold accountable all the parties of the victimization. Until this can happen, and as long as incarceration is seen as the solution, the community will not be a safe place. 63 Because of these fundamentally different worldviews of justice, Aboriginals participating in the non-Aboriginal justice system was itself an experience of colonization. 64 Task forces and commissions found that assuming greater responsibility for the delivery and administration of justice 64 BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16 ("In making the case for Aboriginal control of 'Justice', the RCAP begins by recognizing that [it] has been through the law and the administration of justice that Aboriginal people have experienced the most repressive aspects of colonialism. The RCAP then proposed that it is in Aboriginal law, with Aboriginal law and through Aboriginal law that Aboriginal people aspire to regain control over their lives and communities. The establishment of systems of Aboriginal justice is seen as a necessary part of throwing off the suffocating mantle of a legal system imposed through colonialism."). These issues are examined more closely in Toby S. Goldbach 25-26, 38 (1975) (explaining that many of the reports and commissions attribute sentencing conflict to Aboriginal exclusion from the design and delivery of justice services in Canada. It was at the National Conference on Native Peoples and the Criminal Justice System that concern about Aboriginal experience was first linked to Aboriginal exclusion from the design and delivery of justice services: "The following guidelines . . . were regarded and adopted . . . as a statement of general philosophy underlying any approach to the problems of natives within the criminal justice system. 1. Native persons should be closely involved in the planning and delivery of services associated with criminal justice and native peoples. 2. Native communities should have greater responsibility for the delivery of criminal justice services to their people . . . ."). 66 See, e.g., BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16; James C. MacPherson, Report from the Round Table Rapporteur, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 6 ("One of the more promising themes of the Round Table was the absence of potential jurisdictional impediments to reform in the justice area . . . most of the participants at the Round Table appeared to agree with Patrick Macklem's analysis in his paper dealing with the relationship between the current constitutional framework in the justice field and new Aboriginal justice systems. Professor Macklem stated, 'In my view, neither the current distribution of legislative authority nor the judicature provisions pose any serious impediment to the establishment of a separate or parallel system of justice for Aboriginal people, although federal-provincial cooperation may be required to vest Aboriginal courts with jurisdiction over certain subject matters.'"). 67 Giokas, supra note 16, at 201 ("The solutions most commonly discussed are a separate justice system for aboriginal peoples, parallel systems or considerable accommodation within the existing justice system." Giokas argued that both projects "must be undertaken to eliminate systemic discrimination . . . there must be movement on these two simultaneous projects: developing internal community justice structures; and improving the overall justice system. The latter can be accomplished on the basis of the many recommendations to this effect in the various inquiry reports and can be begun on a unilateral basis by government. Both levels of government have already started on this latter project, however haltingly, and will no doubt outline their efforts to this Commission in another forum."); ROYAL COMM'N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 53; see also SILVERMAN & NIELSEN, supra note 56. justice advocates could burrow themselves within the larger debates about sentencing. Despite vast differences, law reformers, judges, and scholars began to acknowledge parallels between "informal justice" approaches that stressed communitarianism and interdependency, 69 70 See, e.g., LAW COMM'N. OF CAN. & DENNIS COOLEY, FROM RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE DISCUSSION PAPER (1999) (stating that a restorative justice 'movement' began in the early 1970s based on work done with two young offenders arrested for vandalism in Kitchener, Ontario. Within the criminal justice system, restorative justice frequently consisted of victim-offender reconciliation and family group conferences. Family conferencing is an excellent example of why restorative justice and Aboriginal approaches to justice should not be conflated. Family group conferencing relies on the family's ability to evoke shame and show disapproval, which contradicts certain Aboriginal culture and justice practices); Kwochka, supra note 49, at 156 (arguing that recommendations to include Aboriginal involvement in the design and delivery of justice services "having more recognition of Aboriginal culture and law" are most promising "because they fit with a new and vibrant philosophy of criminal justice . . . [which] involves a fundamentally different approach to the criminal justice system that can be loosely characterized under the heading of 'restorative justice.'"); Quigley, supra note 52, at 144 ("Restorative justice is a throwback to the ways of dealing with wrongdoing in many indigenous societies."); Lilles, supra note 20. 71 Quigley, supra note 52, at 144. appeal to "culturally appropriate" programs within already existing structures. 72 Eventually, perceptions about Aboriginal approaches to crime converged with the idea of restorative justice. 73 For example, in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in February 2000, Justice Iacobucci, on behalf of the Court, wrote: "most traditional [A]boriginal conceptions of sentencing hold restorative justice to be the primary objective," and their "approaches place a primary emphasis on the goal of restorative justice." 74 In 1996, Canadian lawmakers codified a broader movement away from deterrence and incapacitation in new sentencing provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code. 75 Thus, transplanted Aboriginal methods received legislative support and increased exposure. Based on the recommendations of a Federal Standing Committee on sentencing, the federal government enacted sweeping changes to the Criminal Code, including new provisions expressly articulating the purposes and principles of sentencing. Still in force, Section 718 outlines the purposes of sentencing for all offenders, including restorative and reparative justice goals. 76 In addition to denunciation, deterrence, and other traditional sentencing objectives, judges can also craft sanctions "to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community." 77 Section 718.2 introduces "other sentencing principles," which requires judges to take into account the goals of predictability and ensures that the offender's liberties are not deprived if less restrictive measures are appropriate. 78 [Vol. 25:61 mandates that judges consider all alternatives to imprisonment and give "particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders." 79 Some judges were already conducting sentencing circles prior to these amendments pursuant to their discretion. However, these amendments to the Criminal Code gave judges legislative authority to transplant Aboriginal practices into the criminal trial. 80 Courts held that the sentencing principles delineated in Section 718.2(e) instruct judges to consider those sentencing procedures that may be appropriate because of the offender's Aboriginal heritage. For example, in a case decided shortly after the new sentencing provisions came into effect, Alberta Provincial Court Justice Marshall interpreted 718.2(e) as providing the legal authority to conduct a sentencing circle. Regarding the language "with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders," Justice Marshall wrote:
This suggests to me that additional tools that are unique to [A]boriginal people such as sentencing circles, traditional healing methods, respect for the advice of elders, etc., should be utilized where reasonably possible and that special recognition should be given to the native traditional way of life, and the effects that the removal from that community, and way of life, would have upon an [A]boriginal offender. Such an approach, it is hoped, would make the justice system more just, meaningful and acceptable to the aboriginal people. 81 Considering the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders goes beyond merely inquiring into the offender's socio-economic circumstances. It also requires a different approach and a willingness to address crime by utilizing those additional tools, which include sentencing circles, that are available to Aboriginal offenders as members of that community. 82 79 Id. s. 718.2 ("A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles . . . (e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances . . . should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances . . . of Aboriginal offenders."). 80 In addition to directing judges to consider express statements of the purposes and principles of sentencing, the amendments to the Criminal Code introduced the conditional sentence of imprisonment as a sentencing option. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 742.1 (explaining that if the offense is not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence and the final sentence is for a period of less than two years, the judge can order a term of imprisonment to be served in the community rather than in a correctional facility). Conditional sentences greatly impact the use of sentencing circles in criminal trial by providing a framework and a form of sentence for the types of recommendations that sentencing circles often craft. See infra Part III.B. . 82 The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to consider Section 718.2 (e) in Gladue, 1 S.C.R., and then shortly thereafter in Wells, 1 S.C.R. In Gladue, the Court noted the emergence During roughly the same period sentencing circles were being transplanted into the criminal trial, the Aboriginal Justice Initiative (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , and its successor, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy (1996-present), provided a bureaucratic structure for Aboriginal justice programs. 83 The federal government-in cooperation with Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, the former Office of the Solicitor General (now Public Safety Canada), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Policedeveloped initiatives to foster programs that could "be the foundation of long term administration of justice improvements within the framework of the Canadian law for Aboriginal people." 84 In partnership with provincial and territorial governments, the federal government funded "community-based justice programs" on a cost-sharing basis, which included sentencing circles, training, and development related to justice programs. 85 of "innovative sentencing practices, such as healing and sentencing circles, and aboriginal community council projects, which are available especially to [A]boriginal offenders." 1 S.C.R. ¶ 74. While it declined to discuss sentencing circles in detail, the Court did write that " 
III. SENTENCING CIRCLE OUTCOMES
A. Sentencing Circles in the Criminal Trial
Following standard comparative law and legal transplant methodology, 86 this Part examines the effects of importing Aboriginal healing circles into the sentencing phase of the criminal trial. This section presents data compiled from a review of all adult criminal trials and appeals dealing with sentencing circles to see how the reforms operate in action and to what extent the system is receptive to the new legal transplant. 87 Before presenting this data, this Article introduces the issues and concerns via a difficult, but emblematic, case. The facts are as follows. Sometime between midnight and 5:00 AM, a father lost his two daughters in the field by his house. 88 He was attempting to cross the field to get to his brother-in-law's house to find help for his youngest daughter who he thought was hurt. 89 "Both girls died of hypothermia." 90 The father "pled guilty to criminal negligence" causing death. 91 At trial, he asked for a sentencing circle to be held. 92 The court granted the request, held the sentencing circle, and then delivered the sentence, which included a three-year prison term in a federal penitentiary. 93 The level of controversy and vitriol around the judge's decision to hold the sentencing circle was robust. One reporter likened a sentencing circle to "a group hug for both victims and offenders." 94 Another intimated that given the chance, the sentencing circle's recommendation to the defendant would be to "go stand outside in a snowbank until you're a Popsicle." 95 protestations stands the amount of time and effort the community expended. Twenty-three people participated in an inner circle including: the victims' mother, two members of the community who sat as surrogates for the victims, the defendant's parents, senior elders from Sturgeon Lake First Nation and the Yellow Quill First Nation, interpreters, the judge, and other justice representatives. 96 Another fifty to sixty people observed. 97 The circle met for five hours. In advance of the sentencing circle, member of the reserve spent additional time in healing circles held by the defendant's family. 98 In addition, a mental health specialist conducted interviews to prepare an intervention strategy. 99 The participants made various recommendations. For example, the mental health specialist recommended intervention strategies, such as workshops to teach parenting and life skills, mentoring programs for youths, and a helpline for children. 100 A community elder recommended that defendant serve the elders, acting as a cultural helper and assisting with ceremonial duties, such as setting up rocks for sweat lodges and filling and lighting pipes before ceremonies. 101 The defendant would be required to abstain from alcohol and drugs while in that role and would receive guidance from the elders. 102 The role would be for life and serve as "a reminder that the Creator had not left him." 103 When he announced the decision, the judge thanked the participants, noting that the sentencing circle had given him "valuable insight" into the community's views of the problems it faces. 104 The judge, however, noted that he did not have the authority to order something that would amount to probation for more than three years. 105 His decision was that a proper balancing of the sentencing principles required incarceration for three 96 R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 47. 97 Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 56. 98 Id. 99 Id. at 59; R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 48. 100 Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 59; R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 48 (providing a statement by the court regarding the recommendations made by the mental health specialist: "Dr. Raj Hathiramani, the mental health therapist at Yellow Quill First Nation, provided a comprehensive community healing plan that contained twelve specific recommendations, some that were designed to address community issues well beyond the scope of the Sentencing Circle"). For a discussion on judicial recitation of sentencing circle recommendations see infra Part IV.
101 R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 51. 102 Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 57. 103 R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 51. 104 Id. ¶ 53. 105 Id. ¶ 69.
[Vol. 25:61 years. 106 He wrote that it would be up to Mr. Pauchay, following his incarceration, to decide whether he wanted the support of the Yellow Quill First Nation. 107 It seemed everyone did everything right; an alternative, culturally appropriate process was used and the judge engaged in the proper legal analysis. Yet, because so many people spent so much time to work on recommendations-only to have the judge say "thank you"-one can easily find themselves frustrated and perturbed when reading the case. Again juries are generally not involved in sentencing in Canada, but once we do involve the community and ask them to participate, is there any duty on the judge to adopt any part of the sentencing recommendations or to consider them in a particular way?
B. Requests for Sentencing Circles
Taking a macro view, what follows is a review of the treatment of sentencing circles in all cases where judges considered them during the course of an adult criminal trial under the Canadian Criminal Code. 108 A search for the phrase "sentencing circle" and "circle sentencing" generated 103 distinct hits. 109 These 103 hits included motions, final declarations or dispositions on sentencing, appellate level decisions of cases relating to sentencing circles, as well as cases that referred to the sentencing circle process, but where sentencing circles were not actually conducted in the trial.
The cases were initially divided according to whether they related to requests for sentencing circles, trials where sentencing circles were held, or cases where the parties appealed. Appeals could consist of reviews of decisions of whether to hold a sentencing circle, or reviews of the sentence 106 Id. 107 
Id.
108 This will capture all published criminal trial decisions in Canada. Through online databases, such as LexisNexis, Quicklaw, and the Canadian Legal Information Institute ("CanLII"), Canadian courts publish all judgments on criminal code matters, including appellate decisions and decisions of lower and higher court judges who are provincially and federally appointed, respectively. What this does not include are cases that are diverted from the criminal justice system, and young offenders who may go through the sentencing circle process, but whose decisions remain unpublished. Therefore, there will be an amount of activity that is not covered by this review. However, in so far as the reforms were meant to provide Aboriginal communities with authority over the design and delivery of justice services, implementation and outcomes within the adult criminal trials provide highly relevant information. Moses because it is widely acknowledged as the first case where this process was used. The data includes the first case and reflects the transition in judicial discourse towards referring to the process as "circle sentencing" or a "sentencing circle." itself when a sentencing circle was held. Of the cases that were reviewed, there were forty-eight cases in which a request for a sentencing circle was made to a judge. 110 Of the forty-eight cases in which a defendant made a request before a judge to hold a sentencing circle, judges allowed a circle to be held in thirty-seven cases. 111 The table below indicates the number of requests for sentencing circles per year. Viewed in the aggregate, the data seems to indicate that judges were favorable to allowing sentencing circles. However, the data looks different when focusing on reported decisions in which the judge actually considered the request as a motion on the merits. Of the sixteen cases where the request 110 These forty-eight cases include decisions in which the judge documented the disposition on a formal application to the court in a distinct decision, as well as cases where a disposition was inferred from reported sentencing decisions or appellate level decisions. In some of the decisions, the court had already held a sentencing circle and the trial judge delivered the sentence. In those cases, either the Crown consented to the request for a sentencing circle or the judge held a hearing but did not write reasons regarding the request. was contested, or the judge considered it as a motion on the merits and wrote reasons for the decision, judges denied eleven of the requests for a sentencing circle. 112 In three cases, the judge held a hearing or discussed reasons for allowing a sentencing circle even though the Crown already consented. 113 The table below shows no discernible trend in the number of requests allowed over the examined period, which suggest consistency in judicial attitudes towards conducting sentencing circles. Although, there was a considerable decline in requests for sentencing circles between 1998 and 2004, which may be the result of unfavorable decisions in early appeals of trials that implemented sentencing circles. 114 In all jurisdictions, judges developed criteria to consider in determining whether a particular case was appropriate for a sentencing circle. In Saskatchewan, trial courts consider seven criteria, which were originally articulated by Provincial Judge Fafard in R. v. Joseyounen. 115 British Columbia trial courts adopted these seven criteria, 116 whereas the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal reviewed the criteria and adopted five of the seven factors for their courts. 117 The relevant factors that judges consider when determining whether to allow a sentencing circle present similar themes, especially with regard to issues relating to the accused, the victim, and the community's participation. The table below amalgamates the criteria, which appear across all provinces, and identifies which factors were considered when denying a request for a sentencing circle. 118 ), but it does not include Fafard's factors regarding whether the facts were agreed upon and whether the accused agreed to be referred to a sentencing circle, as there were no cases that were denied for these reasons. A more appropriate or accurate way to deal with issues involving the accused is to query whether the accused sufficiently accepted responsibility for his or her actions before involving the victim and the community in a joint process).
Judges across each province apply tests or criteria to determine whether a sentencing circle is appropriate in a particular case. 121 The list of factors for the tests or criteria were developed and modified as individual judges referred to similar judicial action in other provinces. 122 It should also be noted that in the Newfoundland and Labrador case referred to above, 123 the Court of Appeal went out of its way to identify that the trial judge's mistake was not the decision to allow a sentencing circle, rather, the judge failed to consider whether the relevant criteria was met. 124 The appellate court concluded that the trial judge erred: not because he used a sentencing circle. (That may or may not have been an appropriate decision in the exercise of his discretion.) He did so, rather, because there were relevant factors that he should have considered, but that he did not (or, at least, there is no record of his ever having considered them). 125 
C. Sentencing Circle Recommendations
Once the trial judge allows a sentencing circle, the court will adjourn for a period of time to allow for necessary preparations. 126 normally appear during the sentencing phase of the trial, including the defendant, defense counsel, the Crown, the police, social workers, and the judge, also participate in the sentencing circle. 127 Additionally, the victim and members of his or her family, as well as members of the defendant's family and other members of the community will also be present. 128 Talking about the crime and its impact is meant to be an educational experience, where the defendant learns about why and how his or her actions had a negative impact. 129 It is also an opportunity for participants to discuss larger socioeconomic issues facing the community. 130 At the conclusion, the circle will present recommendations for sentencing to the judge. 131 The court adjourns for final submissions, and then the judge delivers the sentence. It is important to analyze how judges treat sentencing circle recommendations in the final sentencing decision. With respect to the cases discussed in this Article, judges accepted the recommendations of sentencing circles in eighteen of the thirty-seven reported cases. 132 However, in seven of those cases, the Crown successfully reversed the sentence on appeal. 133 The table below shows the number of sentencing circle recommendations from 1992 to 2010. During this span, trial judges accepted recommendations in eighteen cases and explicitly rejected them in seven cases.
Poker back on track again."); R. v. Taylor (1995), 132 Sask. R. 221, para. 1 (Can. Sask. Q.B.) (noting that the "consensus" of the community participants "was that Taylor should be banished to an island for the period of one year and if he completes this period of banishment then he should be put on probation for three years with conditions that he attend a program on sexual abuse, anger management and alcoholism and that he would not have contact with the victim for a period of three years from the commencement of the probation); R. v. Paul (D.) (1998) (noting that because of the victim's concerns, "the circle proceeded more as a broad discussion of themes than for the specific purpose of formulating recommendations for sentencing . . . ." But, the court later notes that the trial judge's conditions for probation, namely "hosting a potlatch; organizing a Man's Talking and Sharing Circle; and completing the community service hours . . . parallel the recommendations which emerged from the talking circle held on 13 February 2004 . . . ."); Kahypeasewat, 284 Sask. R. 55, para. 62 (stating that participants at the sentencing circle "were given an opportunity to provide input into sentencing options"). 132 See infra Appendix B for cases where sentencing circles were held, by case, year, and court. 133 In total, the Crown appealed over one third of the cases-seventeen out of forty-seven-in which sentencing circles were requested or held. Defense council appealed only one out of eighteen circle sentences. Moreover, the Crown succeeded in thirteen of its seventeen appeals. A troubling statistic remains that the status in twelve of the thirty-seven cases in which sentencing circles were held and recommendations given are unknown. In these twelve decisions, the trial judge neither specified the nature of the recommendations made by the sentencing circle participants, nor whether the recommendations were followed. In some cases, the judge did impose a conditional sentence, which may indicate that the judge accepted the circle's recommendations, 134 although such acceptance is impossible to confirm. The chart below revises the data in Table 3 to include decisions that do not discuss the specific recommendations made by sentencing circle participants. Canadian criminal procedure does not require judges to disclose the details of pre-sentencing information in their sentencing decisions. 135 Consequently, in the twelve cases where the trial judge did not note the details of the recommendations, the judge may have treated sentencing circle recommendations in the same manner as other pre-sentencing information. 136 On the other hand, there were several instances where judges treated sentencing circle recommendations quite differently from presentencing reports or information. 137 For example, in R. v. Labelle (B.), the judge dealt with the sentencing circle recommendations as if they were part of a negotiated agreement that would become valid once endorsed by the court. 138 
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Debates in Comparative Law
In Part III we saw that there was a transplant effect, especially at the final sentencing stage, where judges were unsure what to do with sentencing circle recommendations. 139 Why does this matter? How is this case different from any other legal problem where there is a transplant effect? This Article proposes that there is a difference when the transplant is undertaken not only because it represents best practices, but also because those best practices represent cultural and humanistic goals. Furthermore, this Article argues that there are increased risks when normative and cultural expressions are instrumentalized. This occurs when the expressive genre of law, which attempts to reflect the world, is used as an instrument, 140 and, when this happens, its implementation, outcomes, and transplant effects must be examined.
To examine the instrumental value of sentencing circles within the Aboriginal culture it is important to evaluate scholarship in comparative law. Wigmore, a legal scholar in the area, defines comparative law as "the tracing of an identical or similar idea or institution through all or many [legal] systems, with a view to discovering its differences and likenesses in various systems, the reasons for those variations, and the nature and limits of the inherent and invariable idea . . . ." 141 However, Wigmore does not ask to what objective are comparisons made-to acquire a body of knowledge or map legal traditions? 142 What exactly do we compare when we engage in an exercise of comparative law? 143 Comparative law scholars compare legal systems that face the same, universal problems. 144 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Koẗz wrote that the purpose of comparative investigations is always functional and instrumental, 145 while particular legal institutions and different laws are meant to solve social problems that are similar among these institution. 146 Thus, comparative law allows scholars to discover the best practices, of both legal rules and institutions, which one legal system can transplant to another. 147 Comparative law scholars also consider functionality when deciding which laws to compare because, "incomparables" cannot productively be contrasted while "those which fulfill the same function" can be. 148 According to these "social purpose functionalists," 149 functionally equivalent legal institutions are transported between legal systems for their improvement. The view that imported legal institutions address social, economic, or political goals is solidly entrenched in a broader history of thinking that views law as a tool and society as a site that needs fixing. 150 [Vol. 25:61 "Legal instrumentalism"-the idea of law as a tool or a means to an end-is currently at the center of American legal thinking. 151 In many ways, law's instrumentality is also what makes it interesting as an object of study. 152 Those who derogate from the law as a tool axiom appear to challenge a whole ontology of law. 153 The "culturalists" could be said to constitute a second group of comparativists. 154 These scholars hold to the Savigny/Montesqui idea of l'Esprit de loi 155 -that positive law is the spirit of the people. 156 In this group, scholars are less sanguine about the possibilities of transplanting whole legal rules or institutions. These scholars believe that law is part of a cognition or culture 157 that societies accept 158 or translate. 159 Thus, societies cannot transport best practices. 160 Scholarship among this group ranges in a spectrum from weak cultural theorists, who believe that legal institutions transfer between legal families, 161 to strong theorists, like Legrand who argue that because national or local culture determines the nature and specifics of legal institutions, it never make senses to talk about legal transplants. 162 In comparative law and scholarship on legal transplants, this could be referred to as the "does culture matter" 163 debate.
B. Objectification of Legal Knowledge
The commissions and task forces that investigated Aboriginal confrontation within the criminal justice system were clearly situated on the culture side of this debate. Aboriginal justice advocates saw conceptions of justice as "integrally related to that society's world views and life philosophies." 164 Reports noted vast differences between Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal approaches to righting legal wrongs-Aboriginal approaches sought restoration and healing, whereas Euro-Canadian criminal justice sought deterrence and punishment. 165 This conflict between two sets of justice values produced feelings of alienation and contributed to overincarceration of Aboriginal offenders. 166 Culture mattered.
On the other hand, the exercise in comparative law-comparing EuroCanadian and Aboriginal approaches to justice-was instrumental. Researchers sought to show how traditional Aboriginal healing circles and the sentencing phase of the criminal trial were functionally similar, addressing the same social problem: crime in the community. Comparing Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal approaches had a purpose. It was an effort to look at "foreign" law to assist with a criminal law "domestic" reform project. 167 Aboriginals' feelings of alienation and negative experiences originated in the incompatibility between two justice systems and worldviews, 168 169 Ralf Michaels argues that scholars often over-estimate the possibility that legal systems will converge by ignoring entrenched legal paradigms, for example, in determining jurisdiction for private law matters. 170 A similar problem exists here, as law reformers sought to harmonize alternative dispute resolution methods with Aboriginal justice approaches. Those scholars and practitioners, who advocated adapting Aboriginal methods for dealing with harm to the community, were optimistic 171 about the possibilities of transplantation when the "origin" and "host" legal systems had contrasting and entrenched legal paradigms. 172 This case study, however, represents more than merely an example of harmonizing systems with entrenched legal paradigms or transplanting legal institutions into unreceptive legal systems. 173 In addition, these transplanted sentencing circles are an example of instrumentalizing the expressive. Scholars, practitioners, and reformers articulated the legal expression of Aboriginal culture. They conveyed the meaning of Aboriginal justice as a way to identify that group and its particular concerns, 174 and then turned that meaning back on itself in order to serve a useful function.
Sentencing circles represent both kinds of objectification of legal knowledge: they are a reflection of Aboriginal culture, and they are a "thing in the world" 175 -a process that takes place at the sentencing phase of the criminal trial. Here, though, the two genres of legal acts 176 -the expressive and instrumental genres-are integrated and conflated. The fact that sentencing circles could serve as an identifier of Aboriginal culture and stand in for traditional healing circles in the Euro-Canadian trial was instrumental to the reformers' goals.
Of course, overlap and intermingling of the instrumental and the expressive in lawmaking is not unique to this Canadian case study. This arises when law and development literature points to rule of law or democratic freedom as the key to progress, 177 when state department programs link gender equality indicators with national security, 178 or when scholars point to constitutionalism as an organizing concept or archetype in legal thought. 179 Canada's reform of criminal sentencing procedures, however, stands as a particularly poignant example of this movement toward cultural and normative goals. It also brings to light the hazards associated with material "things in the world" and the difficulties in mixing the material with the symbolic. 180 Reformers had some expectations about the transcendent aspects of sentencing circles, but sentencing circles are also concretely present. Sentencing circles are procedures in which real peopledefendants, victims, and community members-participate.
C. Introducing Legal Techniques
When reviewing the judicial decisions it became evident that-unlike the instances of judges responding to sentencing circle requests with a list of factors to consider-judges did not develop common law directive tools to assist in processing sentencing circle recommendations. When a sentencing circle was requested, judges limited their discretion by creating tests and identifying criteria that had to be considered. By comparison, at the final stage of crafting the sentence, judges treated the sentencing circle recommendations inconsistently and without disciplined legal techniques.
Several judges did not give an account of the sentencing circle recommendations for the record. 181 Sometimes judges compared the recommendations to pre-sentence reports or victim impact statements, and at other times judges seemed to approach the recommendations as if they were a negotiated settlement. There were no tests, factors, or technical practices that judges implemented to decide whether or not to include sentencing circle recommendations into the final sentence. At this second stage-after the sentencing circle has been conducted-judges were left without legal techniques and technologies to assist in processing the information, in weighing and balancing considerations, or in dealing with legal conflicts.
At first glance, this absence of legal devices may not seem problematic. One could argue that conducting a sentencing circle allows the judge to get more information about the accused and the community's ability to help monitor conditions. Nevertheless, the final sentencing rests with the judge. While section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes Aboriginal rights and practices, 182 these are not unlimited rights and must be compatible with Canadian sovereign authority. 183 In other words, Canadian sovereign authority has a monopoly on sentencing and incarceration, such that the potential right to a pre-existing practice to conduct healing circles is not unfettered.
This technical legal argument is not overly persuasive in light of a technical counterargument. If the sentencing circle is merely an information gathering exercise, there is no reason to require a test to decide whether a sentencing circle can be held. If there are criteria to determine whether to allow the request for a sentencing circle, the sentencing circle is ab initiodistinct from other pre-sentencing practices without tests. 181 See discussion supra note 81. 182 The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 183 See Mitchell v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (Can.) (explaining that the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that even if an Aboriginal community had a tradition of military force as part of its distinctive culture, there is no concurrent right to deploy an army and that only the Canadian sovereign authority may maintain a military and use force within its own territory).
Sentencing circle recommendations may appear functionally similar to pre-sentencing reports or victim impact statements. However, focusing on the instrumental form-"the particular devices, practices, or orientations"-184 makes the differences apparent. The practices required to compose presentencing reports, victim impact statements, and sentencing circle recommendations differ. 185 A pre-sentence report is put together by a probation officer in the course of his or her employment, usually in the form of a document with questions. 186 On the other hand, sentencing circle recommendations come about through unscripted, guided discussion by varied numbers of volunteers participating and observing. The process can be lengthy and intrusive to the lives of the victims, the accused, and the community.
The level and extent of community participation in sentencing circles brings to mind jury or lay judge involvement in the legal system. 187 Scholars have noted the similarities between jury participation and democracy. 188 The link between political and judicial participation also figures prominently into [Vol. 25:61 the Canadian reforms. 189 While the government eventually disaggregated the political goals from the goal to increase Aboriginal participation in justice design and delivery, the notion of "citizen-in-justice" has always been integrated into the Aboriginal Justice Strategy mandate. 190 The Aboriginal Justice Initiative and its successor, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy, could not be legitimate if Aboriginal communities did not have the right to administer justice. At the very least, the federal government has indicated its intention to delegate authority to federally-funded Community Justice Committees in a way that should make outright dismissal of sentencing circle recommendations inappropriate. 191 Moreover, the 1996 amendments to the sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code were clearly meant to address a lack of expertise that sentencing scholars had previously identified. Judges were generalists without consistent application of the purposes of sentencing or principles governing legal sanctions. 192 In sentencing circles, in particular, cultural and personal expertise shifts to the community. Unlike juries and lay judges, "lay" participants in sentencing circles occupy the role of experts through their knowledge of culturally appropriate procedures and often through a familiarity with the accused. 193 As already noted, in many communities this expertise is constituted, institutionalized, and bureaucratized through government-funded Aboriginal Justice Committees.
V. CONCLUSION
Three developments reformed sentencing for Aboriginal offenders in the criminal trial, including the ad hoc way in which judges began conducting sentencing circles, the 1996 Criminal Code amendments that directed judges to consider the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders, and the establishment of the Aboriginal Justice Strategy. The examination of reported decisions reveals that transplanting Aboriginal sentencing circles into the criminal trial was neither an outright success nor failure. A "transplant effect" 194 occurred with judges seemingly unsure of how to integrate sentencing circle recommendations or what was being asked of them during the final 189 LaPrairie, supra note 69; see also BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16. Initially, the rationale for funding the Aboriginal Justice Initiative was to support participation in justice administration in order to prepare communities for treaty negotiations and some measure of political administration. Id.
190 ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011, supra note 83. 191 See discussion supra note 81.
192 CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 68. 193 This also parallels historical accounts of juries in England who would testify to their personal knowledge of local disputes. 194 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 167. sentencing stage. The data reveals a stark contrast between legal criteria developed at the request stage and the absence of technical legal knowledge practices at the recommendation and sentencing stage.
The history of sentencing reform in Part II describes how law reform projects constituted cultured procedures, which then became instruments reformers could use. In comparing justice principles, Aboriginal justice advocates identified an expression of Aboriginal culture as the solution to both humanistic experiential and sociological goals. I call this an instrumentalizing of the expressive, where an attempt to generate meaning was not only the end-goal, but also the tool-the "thing in the world"-to accomplish other goals that law reformers defined. 195 By way of conclusion, this Article suggests that, when transforming the expressive into a tool, a technical approach might be just the thing to reveal knowledge and enable normative goals.
Rather than excoriate the judges who were involved in these decisions, I want to appeal to the technical knowledge practices that legal intermediaries already use to mediate risk. 196 Unfortunately, in American legal thinking, the technical aspects of legal knowledge practices are conflated with legal formalism as to how law does its work, and as to the opposite of what law does. Those legal thinkers who reacted against formalism did so in part because of formalism's capacity to obscure what was felt to be politically based decisions; 197 for example, decisions favoring corporations over labor. On the other hand, with respect to sentencing circles, it is legal formality that established sentencing circles as a legal procedure. Through the application of tests and precedent, sentencing circles have become accessible within the criminal trial. It is where form is absent, at the stage of processing the sentencing circle's recommendations, that knowledge and politics are obscured.
In the case of sentencing circles, formalities may reveal reason. Instead of obscuring preferences, legal technicalities at the recommendation stage may force judges to be explicit about their preferences, such as between justice theories or between expert versus "lay" decision-making in sentencing offenders. Applying technical legal knowledge practices at this stage may also be the kind of formality that facilitates, rather than hinders, desired constitutive and corrective justice goals. In the very least, some kind of technical legal practice by judges at the recommendation stage would reinforce Aboriginal authority to administer justice, and confer respect on the community's voice. The technical part of law, including reports, legislation, and logical legal reasoning delivered sentencing circles as a legal procedure 195 Law as Object, supra note 13, at 9-11. 196 VALVERDE, supra note 29, at 192. 197 See generally SUMMERS, supra note 12.
[Vol. 25:61 in the criminal trial. Where technique was absent, knowledge became obstructed and social normative goals were put in jeopardy. Especially where an expression of culture is used as a tool, those engaged in law reform must challenge themselves to explore outcomes as evidence of unmet expectations.
